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Since Damasio introduced the somatic markers hypothesis in Damasio (1994), it has
spread through the psychological community, where it is now commonly acknowledged
that somatic states are a factor in producing the qualitative dimension of our
experiences. Present actions are emotionally guided by those somatic states that were
previously activated in similar experiences. In this model, somatic markers serve as a
kind of embodied memory. Here, we test whether the manipulation of somatic markers
can modulate the emotional evaluation of negative memories. Because facial feedback
has been shown to be a powerful means of modifying emotional judgements, we
used it to manipulate somatic markers. Participants first read a sad story in order to
induce a negative emotional memory and then were asked to rate their emotions and
memory about the text. Twenty-four hours later, the same participants were asked to
assume a predetermined facial feedback (smiling) while reactivating their memory of
the sad story. The participants were once again asked to fill in emotional and memory
questionnaires about the text. Our results showed that participants who had smiled
during memory reactivation later rated the text less negatively than control participants.
However, the contraction of the zygomaticus muscles during memory reactivation did
not have any impact on episodic memory scores. This suggests that manipulating
somatic states modified emotional memory without affecting episodic memory. Thus,
modulating memories through bodily states might pave the way to studying memory as
an embodied function and help shape new kinds of psychotherapeutic interventions.
Keywords: somatic markers, memory, embodied cognition, facial feedback hypothesis, reconsolidation
Introduction
Folk conceptions often assume memory to be a ‘storehouse’ in which memories can be recollected
exactly as they were encoded. Yet, this static model of memory has been disputed by scientists.
More than 100 years ago, Müller and Pilzecker pointed out that newly acquired information can
disrupt previously acquired memories (Lechner et al., 1999). In proposing the concept of memory
consolidation, they emphasized memory’s dynamic nature. Memories are initially labile and need
time to progressively consolidate, i.e., to become insensitive to interference. In recent decades,
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several studies in cognitive psychology and neuroscience have
shown that even consolidated memories are not necessarily ﬁxed
and can be transformed. These observations gave rise to the
reconsolidation theory, according to which even consolidated
memories, when reactivated, return to a labile state and need
reconsolidation processes to be re-stabilized (Nader, 2003; Dudai,
2006; Nader and Einarsson, 2010; Alberini, 2011). This theory
fully accounts for the fact that memory is not a collection
of realistic “photographs” of past events and sheds new light
on why humans can form false memories (Loftus and Davis,
2006; Chan et al., 2009; Hardt et al., 2010). Instead of
being a cognitive impairment, memory malleability appears
to be critical for a fully adaptive memory, i.e., its ability
to be updated according to new circumstances (Lee, 2009;
Gisquet-Verrier and Riccio, 2012).
Evidence for the reconsolidation process is supported by
observations of experimental amnesia provoked by various
treatments given during memory reactivation. For instance,
propranolol, a non-selective beta-blocker, has been shown to
interfere with reconsolidation of negative emotional memory
in healthy subjects and in patients with post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD; Pitman et al., 2002; Kindt et al., 2009; Donovan,
2010; Debiec et al., 2011; Lonergan et al., 2012; Schwabe
et al., 2012). Subjects that received propranolol before memory
reactivation had reduced capacities to recall negative memories
(Schwabe et al., 2012). These studies commonly assume that this
eﬀect is mainly due to propranolol’s interference with cellular
reconsolidation mechanisms, in particular noradrenergic activity
in the amygdala.
Yet, propranolol is also known to impact the sympathetic
nervous system (i.e., decreased heart rate). This echoes the
James-Lange peripheralist theory of emotions, to which Damasio
has recently provided additional neurophysiological evidence
(Damasio, 1996; Bechara et al., 2000a,b). According to Damasio’s
somatic marker hypothesis, when an individual encounters
new situations that evoke previous emotional experiences, or
when emotional memories are recovered, the physiological
states associated with the recalled event are automatically
reactivated (Bechara et al., 2003). Such evidence ﬁts well within
the framework of “embodied cognition” which departs from
mainstream cognitive science by positing that “cognition deeply
depends on aspects of the agent’s body other than the brain.”
(Shapiro, 2007; Wilson and Foglia, 2011). In line with the
Damasio’s approach, we propose here that somatic markers
constitute embodied memories and we ask to which extent this
hypothesis oﬀers a fresh perspective on the study of emotional
memory malleability.
Indeed, in Damasio’s thesis, the memory of a frightening
experience can be decomposed into two interdependent
elements: (1) the episodic memory tied with the event and
(2) the congruent somatic states (e.g., an elevated heart rate)
associated with it. If we accept Damasio’s conceptual framework,
one could ask whether peripheral somatic modiﬁcations
are at least partly responsible for a decrease in intensity
of posttraumatic symptoms – or more generally, fearful
memories – when propranolol is administrated before memory
reactivation. Yet, before testing this hypothesis, one ought to
investigate whether manipulating somatic states during memory
reactivation interferes with further emotional evaluations
of the memory. In other words, will a negative memory be
remembered as less negative for those whose bodily states were
manipulated in order to mimic a pleasant emotion during
memory reactivation?
Previous studies investigated the link between memory and
somatic states. For instance, it has been shown that bodily states
facilitate the accessibility of emotionally congruent memories:
subjects recall more positive memories when smiling (Riskind,
1983) and remember more negative items if they sit in slumped
positions during memory encoding (Michalak et al., 2014).
These previous studies have explored to what extent the
manipulation of somatic states impacts or biases accessibility to
emotional memories. To our knowledge, however, no studies
have investigated how somatic states manipulation can modulate
the emotional evaluation of a memory.
To test the possible eﬀect of somatic state on the evaluation
of an emotional memory, we used facial feedback manipulation
during memory reactivation. Several studies have demonstrated
that manipulating facial feedback can aﬀect emotional evaluation
(Strack et al., 1988; Larsen et al., 1992; Alam et al., 2008;
Davis et al., 2009). Importantly, these eﬀects are observed
even if subjects are unaware that they are producing a facial
expression; i.e., smiling is induced by asking participants to
hold a pen between teeth (Strack et al., 1988), frowning by
looking at the sun (Marzoli et al., 2013), or reducing the
distance between golf tees attached to the eyebrow (Larsen et al.,
1992). For instance, Strack et al. (1988) showed that participants
whose zygomaticus muscles were contracted by holding a pen
between their teeth judged cartoons funnier than did non-
smiling participants. More generally, it is worth mentioning
that facial feedback has been shown to modulate sympathetic
activations like heart rate and skin conductance (Soussignan,
2002; Lee et al., 2013) and to increase stress recovery, both
at physiological and psychological levels (Kraft and Pressman,
2012). Since these studies highlight the immediate eﬀect of
facial feedback on emotional judgments, we hypothesized
that facial feedback might also have an impact on further
evaluation of emotional memories if manipulated during
memory reactivation.
To test our hypothesis, we asked participants to read and rate
their emotions about a negative text immediately after reading
(day1) and 24 h after reading (day2). Unconscious smiling
was induced during memory reactivation (day2) with a similar
procedure as described in Strack et al. (1988), namely by holding
a pen between the teeth (smiling), whereas control groups had no
contraction of zygomaticus muscles. We predicted that smiling
during reactivation should decrease the negative emotional
evaluation of the text without aﬀecting episodic memories.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Eighty-four healthy, French-speaking undergraduate students
(41 males and 43 females, mean age 23.2 ± 0.54 SEM)
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were recruited at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland.
All participants completed consent forms and received
compensation for their participation (15 CHF). The local
ethical committee approved the procedure.
We induced unconscious smiling in a manner similar to
previous studies (Strack et al., 1988), by asking participants to
hold a 12 mm diameter pen (Hedding 21) between their teeth
(smiling group) or between their lips or with the non-dominant
hand (control groups). Participants were randomly assigned to
one of the three following experimental groups.
Unconscious Smile Group
Teeth: 31 participants (16 males and 15 females; mean age
22.4 ± 0.84 SEM). Participants were asked to hold the pen
between their teeth without touching the lips. This manipulation
produces a facial muscular activity comparable to a smile
(contraction of the zygomaticus muscles), but the experimenter
never mentioned the word “smiling” in the instruction.
Two Control Groups
Lips: 27 participants (12 males and 15 females; mean age
24.8 ± 1.30 SEM). Participants held the pen between their lips,
thus holding the pen in their mouth in a position incompatible
with a contraction of the zygomaticus muscles (smiling). Non-
dominant hand: 26 participants (13 males and 13 females; mean
age 22.4 ± 0.43 SEM). Participants were asked to perform the
drawing task (see below) while holding the pen in the non-
dominant hand. The Hand control group allowed us to assess
whether holding a pen in the mouth had an eﬀect independent
of smiling.
Procedure
Our experimental protocol took place across two sessions
separated by approximately 24 h (Figure 1). All tests were
conducted in the same quiet room.
Day 1
On the ﬁrst day, the procedure of the experiment was described
to the participants with a special emphasis on the drawing task
and information about the way they were to hold the pen during
the second day. We used a “multitasking study” cover story
(Strack et al., 1988) to avoid awareness of smiling during the facial
feedback manipulation. Participants were then asked to ﬁll two
questionnaires:
(1) The short form of the French version of the Beck’s
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961; Bourque and
Beaudette, 1982). This thirteen items questionnaire
assessed the level of depressive symptoms before
experimental manipulation.
(2) The French version of the twenty-question Positive and
Negative Aﬀect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988;
Gaudreau et al., 2006) used to measure positive activation
(PA) and negative activation (NA) at three points in time:
before (PANAS 1) and after reading the text on the ﬁrst
day (PANAS 2) and after facial feedback manipulation on
the second day (PANAS 3). The instructions for ﬁlling out
PANAS were: “Answer according to how you feel at the
present moment.”
After completing BDI and the ﬁrst PANAS questionnaire,
participants read a text excerpt from a casebook written by a
pediatrician (Naouri, 2006). This excerpt of 1824 words relates
the sad story of a woman who lived an unhappy childhood,
contracts leukemia, and whose unfaithful husband had a child
with her own sister. This text was chosen in order to induce a
negative emotional memory in participants. Immediately after
reading the text, participants once again completed the PANAS
form. The comparison between the PANAS scores, before and
after the reading, allowed us to measure the direct impact of the
text on subject’s positive and NAs. As the text touched upon issues
of unfaithfulness, marital status was considered in the analysis to
ensure it had no eﬀect on the emotional evaluation of the text
(53 participants reported to be single and 31 reported to be in a
relationship).
Next, participants were asked to ﬁll out a questionnaire
assessing their emotions regarding the text. Questions were rated
on 10-point Likert scales. We used two questionnaires that were
counterbalanced across the 2 days to avoid memory eﬀects. Each
item of the ﬁrst questionnaire was related to an item of the second
questionnaire with close face validity. The negative emotional
evaluation toward the text was assessed with nine questions
related to negative emotions like sadness or anger, e.g., “This
testimony makes me sad,” “This testimony makes me angry,” “The
husband’s behavior is immoral.”
Finally, the respondents completed a questionnaire assessing
their memory of the text. We used two questionnaires with eight
open questions that were designed to have a mild degree of
diﬃculty (to avoid ceiling or ﬂoor eﬀects). These questions were
directly related to the text, for instance: “How old is the first
son of the couple when they come to consult the pediatrician for
the first time?” “How many times a year does the woman see her
family during her years in boarding school?” Aswith the emotional
assessment forms, the two questionnaires were counterbalanced
between groups and sessions.
Day 2
On the second day, participants were asked to perform drawing
tasks during which the manipulation of facial expression took
place. We used drawing tasks similar to those described by Strack
et al. (1988). The drawing tasks were displayed on paper sheets
ﬁxed to the wall at height of the head of the participants. The ﬁrst
task consisted of drawing a series of straight lines by connecting
two numbered points. The second task involved drawing a line
to connect 10 numbered points, randomly distributed across the
paper sheet. The third task consisted of underlining vowels in a
random series of 64 letters. The fourth task consisted of reading
seven excerpts from the text and to indicate whether the excerpts
were from the beginning, the middle or the end of the text. These
text excerpts were presented in order to reactivate the memory of
the text. Thus facial feedback was manipulated during memory
reactivation and not during the emotional rating of the text.
Participants were then asked to assess the diﬃculty of each task
and the pleasantness of the whole drawing task. To be sure that
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the experimental procedure. On day 1,
participants filled in Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI) and Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule (PANAS) 1 questionnaires. Then, participants read the text,
performed an emotional evaluation and a memory evaluation of the text, and
filled in PANAS 2. On day 2, participants performed a drawing task during which
memory of the text was reactivated while facial feedback was manipulated. Two
minutes after the drawing task, participants realized a second emotional
evaluation and memory evaluation of the text and filled in PANAS 3.
facial feedback eﬀects ceased between the two tasks, a 2-min delay
was introduced between reactivation and rating.
After the drawing task, participants dropped the pen and
ﬁlled out the PANAS 3, the emotional evaluation form and the
memory evaluation questionnaire. At the end of the session, the
experimenter asked participants if they had a hypothesis about
the whole experiment (especially about the drawing task and
the facial feedback procedure) to evaluate the eﬃciency of the
cover story presented in the ﬁrst session. None of the participants
reported that the pen manipulation was meant to provoke a
smile and no one guessed the real hypothesis of our study.
Finally, participants were debriefed, paid and thanked for their
participation.
Results
All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS software (IBM
SPSS Statistics, Hong Kong, China; version 18.0).
We ﬁrst performed separate analysis on control groups (lips
and hand groups). As there was no diﬀerence between these two
control groups, they were regrouped into a single Control group.
Beck’s Depression Inventory and Positive
and Negative Affect Schedule
There was no diﬀerence between groups in the level of depressive
symptoms (BDI scores) at the beginning of the experiment
(Table 1). A three-way ANOVA (group, sex, and marital status)
showed no diﬀerence between groups [F(1,76) = 0.58, p = 0.44]
nor sex [F(1,76) = 3.6, p = 0.06], but a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
marital status, single people having higher scores than people in
a relationship [F(1,76) = 4.35, p = 0.04].
Both groups witnessed an increase of NA and a decrease of
PA after the reading of the text (Table 1). This was conﬁrmed
by a two-way repeated measures ANOVA (group, sex as factors
and NAs in PANAS 1 and 2 as repeated factor) showing a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the repeated measure [F(1,78) = 8.15,
p = 0.006], no group eﬀect [F(1,78) = 1.12, p = 0.29],
no repeated measure∗groups interaction [F(1,78) = 0.75,
p = 0.38] and a non-signiﬁcant trend toward females reporting
higher NAs [F(1,78) = 3.78, p = 0.055]. The decrease of
PAs following the reading of the text was conﬁrmed by a
two-way repeated measures ANOVA (group, sex as factors
and PAs in PANAS1 and 2 as repeated factor) showing a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the repeated measure [F(1,78) = 10.67,
TABLE 1 | Mean scores of the Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI), Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) questionnaires, difficulty and
unpleasantness assessment.
(A) PANAS
Negative activation Positive activation
Groups BDI PANAS1 PANAS 2 PANAS 3 PANAS1 PANAS 2 PANAS 3
Controls 3.7 (±0.4) 17 (±0.7) 19.5 (±0.9) 15.5 (±0.7) 32.7 (±0.8) 29.6 (±0.9) 31.1 (±0.9)
Teeth 4.5 (±0.7) 18.6 (±1.4) 20 (±1.2) 16.4 (±1) 31.5 (±1.2) 30.6 (±1.4) 30.9 (±1.3)
(B)
Groups Difficulty Unpleasantness
Teeth 5.4 (±0.3) 5.9 (±0.4)
Lips 5.5 (±0.3) 5.2 (+0.5)
Hand 3.6 (±0.3) 2.7 (±0.3)
(A) BDI and PANAS mean scores (±SEM). Both Control and Teeth groups showed an increase of negative activation (NA) and a decrease of positive activation (PA)
between PANAS 1 and PANAS 2. There was no effect of facial feedback manipulation on PA and NA on PANAS 3. (B) Mean (±SEM) rating scores for the difficulty and
unpleasantness of the task. Significant differences were found between Hand group and Teeth group as well as between Hand group and Lips group for difficulty and
unpleasantness.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 650
Arminjon et al. Embodied memory
p = 0.002] but no group [F(1,78) = 0.009, p = 0.92] nor
group*repeated measure interaction [F(1,78) = 3.41, p = 0.07]
but a signiﬁcant sex eﬀect; female having lower PA than male
participants [F(1,78) = 11.15, p = 0.001]. Finally, there was no
signiﬁcant eﬀect of marital status on any PANAS questionnaires
scores (p > 0.05) conﬁrming that the text provoked similar
emotional activations in participants independently of their
marital status.
Separate ANOVAs on PANAS 3 (just after facial feedback
manipulation) showed no eﬀect of facial feedback manipulation
on NA [F(1,79) = 1.21, p = 0.27] nor on PA [F(1,79) = 0.06,
p = 0.8].
Mean Rating of Task Difficulty and
Unpleasantness
In contrast to the lack of diﬀerence in the emotional evaluation
results between control participants holding the pen with the
hand or with the mouth, a signiﬁcant diﬀerence was found
between these groups in the diﬃculty and unpleasantness ratings
(Table 1).
Groups holding the pen in the mouth found the drawing more
diﬃcult to accomplish than the group holding the pen in the
non-dominant hand (Table 1). This was conﬁrmed by a two-way
ANOVA (group, sex) which revealed a signiﬁcant group eﬀect
[F(2,78) = 10.65, p < 0.0001] but no sex eﬀect [F(1,78) = 0.7,
p= 0.5]. Post hoc Bonferroni tests on the diﬀerent groups showed
that the hand group had a signiﬁcantly lower diﬃculty score than
both the teeth (p< 0.0001) and lips (p< 0.0001) groups, whereas
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence was found between teeth and lips groups
(p = 1).
Groups who held the pen in their mouth (teeth and lips) also
rated the drawing task to be more unpleasant (Table 1). This
was conﬁrmed by a two-way ANOVA (group, sex) showing a
group eﬀect [F(2,78) = 18.04, p < 0.0001] and no sex eﬀect
[F(1,78) = 0.38, p = 0.53]. Post hoc Bonferroni tests showed that
the hand group rated the drawing task to be less unpleasant than
both the teeth and the lips groups (p< 0.0001), whereas there was
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between lips and teeth groups (p= 0.62).
Emotional Evaluation and Memory Scores
On day 1, immediately following the reading of the text,
participants gave an emotional evaluation of the text (6.23 ± 0.21
for control participants, 6.95 ± 0.25 in the teeth group). For
this initial emotional evaluation on day 1, no signiﬁcant eﬀect
of condition, sex or interaction was found. We calculated mean
scores for day 1 and day 2 and then calculated the diﬀerence
between these 2 days, representing the evolution of emotion and
memory toward the text (day2 scores−day1 scores). We found a
signiﬁcant decrease in negative emotional evaluation in smiling
participants as compared to control participants (Figure 2). This
was conﬁrmed by a three-way ANOVA (group, sex, marital
status) that showed a signiﬁcant group eﬀect [F(1,76) = 5.28,
p = 0.024], but no sex [F(1,76) = 2.49, p = 0.11], nor marital
status eﬀect [F(1,76) = 0.74, p = 0.39].
Concerning memory scores, all groups showed a slight
decrease in their memory scores on day 2. The teeth group had
a score of 4.83 (±0.29) on day 1 and 4 (±0.23) on day 2, whereas
FIGURE 2 | Differential scores for memory and emotional evaluation.
Differential scores were calculated by subtracting day 2 scores to day 1
scores. Scores equal to 0 mean no difference across sessions and negative
scores indicate a decrease from session 1 to session 2. (A) Differential scores
for the memory of the text. (B) Differential scores of emotional evaluation of
the text. Notes: error-bars are SEM, ∗p < 0.05.
the control group had a score of 4.98 (±0.25) on day 1 and 4.18
(±0.26) on day 2. The diﬀerence between memory scores on day
1 and on day 2 is illustrated in Figure 2. A two-way ANOVA
(group and sex) on the memory scores diﬀerence showed no
group [F(1,80) = 0.02, p = 0.86], no sex eﬀect [F(1,80) = 2.32,
p = 0.13] nor sex∗group interaction [F(1,80) = 1.64, p = 0.2].
Discussion
Our results show that somatic state manipulation per se during
memory reactivation interferes with further emotional evaluation
of a negative memory. Indeed, the contraction of the zygomaticus
muscles (unconscious smiling) during memory reactivation
provoked a decrease in negative emotional evaluation toward the
memory of a sad text as compared to its evaluation immediately
following its reading. This suggests that somatic states play a
role not only in the evaluation of a current emotional situation
(Damasio, 1996; Niedenthal, 2007; Damasio and Carvalho, 2013),
but that they also modify the evaluation of an emotionally laden
memory. While the contraction of the zygomaticus muscles
positively modulated the emotional evaluation of memories, it
had no impact on episodic memories (which slightly decreased
for all groups between day 1 and day 2), neither on the general
emotional state of the participants (as shown by the PANAS
assessments). Moreover, participants with activated zygomaticus
muscles evaluated the text as less negative, even though they rated
the drawing task as more unpleasant and diﬃcult than the hand
control participants. In other words, the zygomaticus activated
group’s more positive evaluation of emotionally laden memories
is independent from the conscious feeling accompanying the
manipulation. These results have several clinical and theoretical
implications related to the present results distinguishing between
episodic memories and their emotional counterparts.
First, over the past decade, memory malleability has become
a topic of great interest for the understanding and treatment of
mental disorders (such as post traumatic stress disorder) in which
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strong negative emotional memories play a crucial role (Pitman
et al., 2002; Kindt et al., 2009; Donovan, 2010; Debiec et al., 2011;
Lonergan et al., 2012; Schwabe et al., 2012). Though experimental
use of propranolol allows for a better understanding of how
consolidated memories can still be disrupted or reconsolidate,
propranolol acts as a pharmacological amnesic agent. Thus, using
it to erase memories that are part of a person’s personality –
even if the memories are threatening – raises serious ethical
issues (Henry et al., 2007; Donovan, 2010). If somatic states
manipulation suﬃces to modify the emotional component
associated with a memory, without aﬀecting its content (episodic
memory), our results suggest that ingesting amnesic drugs may
not be required to modify the evaluation of negative memories.
This is in line with the proposition that memory malleability,
through recollection, does not necessarily represent an occasion
for inducing amnesia (Gisquet-Verrier and Riccio, 2012). Rather,
it opens a window for old negative memories to be associated to
new emotional tones.
Second, in the present experiment we found smiling to
modulate the aﬀective tone associated with a negative memory.
Since one of the main tenets of embodied cognition posits that
cognitive functions are inﬂuenced by bodily states (Shapiro,
2007; Wilson and Foglia, 2011), we propose that the somatic
markers involved in the dynamic recollection process can be
deﬁned as embodied memories. It is worth noting that these
somatic eﬀects might not be exclusively peripheral and may be
encoded by the brain mechanisms that underlie facial feedback
eﬀects. For instance, subjects whose upper face expressions
are blocked by Botox injections report less fear and emotions
when viewing fearful stimuli and show a decreased activation
in both the amygdala and the dorsal pons (Davis et al., 2010).
These subcortical structures have been hypothesized to play a
crucial role in the mapping of bodily states (Damasio, 1994;
Damasio and Carvalho, 2013). Thus, in agreement with the
somatic marker hypothesis as formulated by Damasio, memory
is embodied in the sense that the full recollection of a past
event necessitates a close interplay between the reactivation
of a centrally encoded episodic memory and the peripherally
reactivated somatic states that were originally associated to the
memory.
Third, the ethical and embodied aspects of memory
is of relevance for the treatment of certain pathologies
(Ansermet and Magistretti, 2007). As mentioned above, facial
feedback manipulation impacts emotional evaluation even if
participants found the manipulation diﬃcult and unpleasant.
Thus, as participants evaluate the text more positively, their
current feelings are “unconsciously” inﬂuenced by zygomaticus
contraction. These results may partially explain why certain
psychotherapeutic settings are beneﬁcial to patients. A similar
hypothesis has been proposed to explain Eye Movement
Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) eﬃcacy (Schubert
et al., 2011). EMDR has been shown to decrease the physiological
markers associated to distress. As such, reactivating traumatic
experiences while linking them to these relaxing somatic markers
should help patients to deal with their threatening memories
in a more acceptable manner. Furthermore, this data may be
of relevance to explain why “talking cures” are beneﬁcial to
traumatized patients (Bion, 1984; Schottenbauer et al., 2008). The
present results imply that recalling traumatizing events does not
necessarily consolidate the link between the recalled experiences
and the threatening feelings associated to them. Even if the recall
of traumatic events can be ﬁrst felt as unpleasant, it could allow
one to re-associate threatening memories with more positive
emotions (Alberini et al., 2013). Such positive emotions could
be “unconsciously” induced by the reassuring psychotherapeutic
setting and the psychoanalyst’s “benevolent neutrality.”
Finally, understanding and explaining therapeutic eﬃcacy
with regards to somatic marker manipulation still faces several
open issues. If some of the psychotherapeutic eﬀects are to be
based on a re-association of threatening memories with more
pleasant somatic states, then the eﬀect of themanipulation should
exhibit a durable eﬀect. In other words, this new association
would have to be reconsolidated. However, in the present study,
the time between the reactivation and the memory test was
approximately 2 min. Though several studies have used similarly
short times between the reactivation and assessment for memory
reconsolidation (Chan et al., 2009; Chan and LaPaglia, 2013),
a 24-h delay is generally considered to be necessary for full
memory reconsolidation (Schiller et al., 2010; Schwabe et al.,
2012). Further studies that respect the 24-h period should thus
be conducted to test whether the new emotional tone has been
durably associated to an oldmemory, i.e., that the new association
has been reconsolidated.
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